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Abstract
Opinion evolution and judgment revision are mediated through social influence.
Based on a large crowdsourced in vitro experiment (n = 861), it is shown how
a consensus model can be used to predict opinion evolution in online collective
behaviour. It is the first time the predictive power of a quantitative model of
opinion dynamics is tested against a real dataset. Unlike previous research on
the topic, the model was validated on data which did not serve to calibrate it.
This avoids to favor more complex models over more simple ones and prevents
overfitting. The model is parametrized by the influenceability of each individual,
a factor representing to what extent individuals incorporate external judgments.
The prediction accuracy depends on prior knowledge on the participants’ past
behaviour. Several situations reflecting data availability are compared. When
the data is scarce, the data from previous participants is used to predict how a
new participant will behave. Judgment revision includes unpredictable variations
which limit the potential for prediction. A first measure of unpredictability is
proposed. The measure is based on a specific control experiment. More than two
thirds of the prediction errors are found to occur due to unpredictability of the
human judgment revision process rather than to model imperfection.
Introduction
Many individual judgments are mediated by observing others’ judgments. This is true for
buying products, voting for a political party or choosing to donate blood. This is particularly
noticeable on the online world. The availability of online data has lead to a recent surge in
trying to understand how online social influence impact human behaviour. Some in vivo large
scale online experiments were devoted to understand how information and behaviours spread in
online social networks [1], others focused on determining which sociological attributes such as
gender or age were involved in social influence processes [2].
Although decision outcomes are often tied to an objective best choice, outcomes can hardly
be fully inferred from this supposedly best choice. For instance, predicting the popularity of
songs in a cultural market requires more than just knowing the actual song quality [3]. The
decision outcome is rather determined by the social influence process at work [4]. Hence, there
is a need for opinion dynamics models with a predictive power.
Complementarily to the in vivo experiments, other recent studies used online in vitro
experiment to identify the micro-level mechanisms susceptible to explain the way social influence
1
ar
X
iv
:1
51
1.
02
64
7v
3 
 [c
s.S
I] 
 3 
Ju
n 2
01
6
impacts human decision making [5–7]. These recent online in vitro studies have lead to posit
that the so-called linear consensus model may be appropriate to describe the way individuals
revise their judgment when exposed to judgments of others. The predictive power of such a
mechanism remains to be assessed.
Trying to describe how individuals revise their judgment when subject to social influence has
a long history in the psychological and social sciences. The consensus model used in this article
draws from this line of work. These works were originally developed to better understand small
group decision making. This occurs for instance when a jury in civil trials has to decide the
amount of compensation awarded to plaintiffs [8–10]. Various types of tasks have been explored
by researchers. These includes the forecasts of future events e.g., predicting market sales based
on previous prices and other cues [11,12], the price of products [13,14], the probability of event
occurrence [15,16], such as the number of future cattle deaths [17], or regional temperatures [18].
The central ingredient entering in models of judgment revision is the weight which individuals
put on the judgments of others, termed influenceability in the present article. This quantity is
also known as the advice taking weight [14, 17] or the weight of advice [19–21]. It is represented
by a number taking 0 value when the individual is not influenced and 1 when they entirely forget
their own opinion to adopt the one from other individuals in the group. It has been observed
that in a vast majority of the cases, the final judgment falls between the initial one and the ones
from the rest of the group. Said otherwise, the influenceability lies between 0 and 1. This has
been shown to sensibly improve the accuracy of decisions [22]. A 20% improvement has been
found in an experiment when individuals considered the opinion of another person only [19].
However, individuals do not weight themselves and others equally. They rather overweight
their own opinions [23]. This has been coined egocentric discounting [24]. Many factors affect
influenceability. These include the perceived expertise of the adviser [17,25] which may result
from age, education, life experience [26], the difficulty of the task [21], whether the individual
feels powerful [27] or angry [28], the size of the group [29], among others. A sensitivity analysis
has been carried out to determine which factors most affect advice taking [30].
This line of work has focused on determining the factors impacting influenceability. None
has yet answered whether judgment revision models could be used to predict future decisions.
Instead, the models were validated on the data which served to calibrate the models themselves.
This pitfall tends to favor more complex models over more simple ones and may result in
overfitting. The model would then be unable to predict judgment revision from a new dataset.
One reason for this literature gap could be the lack of access to large judgment revision database
at the time, now made more readily available via online in vitro experiments. The predictability
assessment is a necessary step to grow confidence in our understanding and in turn use this
mechanism as a building block to design efficient online social systems. Revising judgments
after being exposed to others’ judgments takes an important role in many online social systems
such as recommendation system [31, 32] or viral marketing campaign [33] among others. Unlike
previous research, the present work provides an assessment of the model predictive power
through crossvalidation of the proposed judgment revision model.
The prediction accuracy of a model is limited to the extent the judgment revision process is a
deterministic process. However, there is theoretical [34–36] and empirical [37] evidence showing
that the opinion individuals display is a sample of an internal probabilistic distribution. For
instance, Vul and Pashler [37] showed that when participants were asked to provide their opinion
twice with some delay in between, participants provided two different answers. Following these
results, the present article details a new methodology to estimate the unpredictability level
of the judgment revision mechanism. This quantifies the highest prediction accuracy one can
expect.
The results presented in this article were derived using in vitro online experiments, where
each participant repeated several times estimation tasks in very similar conditions. These
repeated experiments yielded two complementary sets of results. First, it is shown that, in
presence of social influence, the way individuals revise their judgment can be modeled using a
quantitative model. Unlike the previously discussed studies, the gathered data allow assessing
the predictive power of the model. The model casts individuals’ behaviours according to their
influenceability, the factor quantifying to what extent one takes external opinions into account.
Secondly, a measure of intrinsic unpredictability in judgment revision is provided. Estimating
the intrinsic unpredictability provides a limit beyond which no one can expect to improve
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predictions. This last result was made possible through a specific in vitro control experiment.
Although models of opinion dynamics have been widely studied for decades by sociologist [38]
from a theoretical standpoint, to the best of our knowledge, it is the first time the predictive
power of a quantitative model of opinion dynamics is tested against a real dataset.
Results and Discussion
To quantify opinion dynamics subject to social influence, we carried out online experiments
in which participants had to estimate some quantities while receiving information regarding
opinions from other participants. In a first round, a participant expresses their opinion xi
corresponding to their estimation related to the task. In the two subsequent rounds, the
participant is exposed to a set of opinions xj of other participants who performed the same task
independently, and gets to update their own opinion. The objective of the study is to model
and predict how an individual revises their judgment when exposed to other opinions. Two
types of games were designed : the gauging game, in which the participants evaluated color
proportions and the counting game, where the task required to guess amounts of items displayed
in a picture (see Experiment section in Material and Methods). Participants to this online
crowdsourced study were involved in 3-round judgment revision games. Judgment revision is
modeled using a time-varying influenceability consensus model. In mathematical terms, xi(r)
denotes the opinion of individual i at round r and its evolution is described as
xi(r + 1) = xi(r) + αi(r) · (x¯(r)− xi(r)) (1)
where r = 1, 2 and where x¯(r) is the mean opinion of the group at round r (see Opinion
revision model section in Material and Methods for details and supplementary section S3 for a
test of the validity of the linearity assumption). This model is based on the influenceability
αi(r) of participants, a factor representing to what extent a participant incorporates external
judgments.
Influenceability of participants
The influenceability is described for each participant by two parameters : αi(1), the in-
fluenceability after first social influence and αi(2), the influenceability after second social
influence.
The distribution of couples (αi(1), αi(2)) were obtained by fitting model (1) to the whole
dataset via mean square minimization for each type of games independently. The marginal
distributions of (αi(1), αi(2)) are shown in Fig. 1. Most values fall within interval [0, 1], meaning
that the next judgment falls between one’s initial judgment and the group judgment mean.
Such a positive influenceability has been shown to improve judgment accuracy [22] (see also the
Practical Implications of the Model section). Most individuals overweight their own opinion
compared to the mean opinion to revise their judgment with αi(r) < 0.5. This fact is in
accordance with the related literature on the subject [23].
An interesting research direction is to link the influenceability of an individual to their
personality. One way to measure personality is via the big five factors of personality [39]. It
turns out that influenceability is found not to be significantly correlated to the big five factors
of personality, to education level and to gender. These negative findings are reported in the
Influenceability and personality supplementary section.
The plots in Fig. 1 also display a small fraction of negative influenceabilities. One interpre-
tation would be that the concerned participants recorded opinions very close to the average
group opinion for multiple games. When this happens at one round, the opinion at the following
round has a high probability to move away from the group average. This contributes to negative
influenceabilities in the participants’ influenceabilities during the fitting process.
Is the prediction error homogeneous for all influenceability values ? To see this, each bin of
the influenceability distributions in Fig. 1 is colored to reflect average prediction error. The error
is given in terms of root mean square error (RMSE). The color corresponds to the prediction
error regarding participants having their influenceability falling within the bin. A detailed
definition of RMSE is provided in paragraph Validation procedure in Material and Methods
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section. This information shows that the model makes the best predictions for participants
with a small but non-negative influenceability. On the contrary, predictions for participants
with a high influenceability are less accurate.
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Figure 1. Influenceability over rounds and games. (A) Gauging game, (B)
Counting game : distributions of the αi(1) influenceability after the first round and αi(2)
influenceability after the second round for the time-varying influenceability model (1).
The colormap corresponds to the average prediction RMSE of participants in each
bin. For visualization purposes, one value at αi(1) = −1.5 has been removed from
the histogram in the gauging game, round 1. (There was only one individual with
αi(1) = −1.5. For this particular individual, the linear relationship between xi(2)−xi(1)
and x¯(1)− xi(1) is not significant (p-val = 0.38), so that the coefficient αi(1) = −1.5
should not be interpreted. For the rest of the participants, the level of trust can be
read from the color scale. The color of a bar corresponds to the average prediction error
made for the participants with αi values falling within the bar range.) (C) Cumulated
distributions of αi(1) and αi(2) for each type of games.
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The distribution of influenceabilities of the population is subject to evolution over time.
A two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test rejects equality of distributions between αi(1) and
αi(2) for both types of games (p-val < 10−6, with KS distance of 0.25 and 0.23 for the gauging
game and counting game, respectively). A contraction toward 0 occurs with a median going
from 0.34 for αi(1) to 0.18 for αi(2) in the counting game and 0.32 to 0.20 in the gauging
game (p-val< 10−15 for a paired one-sided Wilcoxon sign-rank test). In other words, the
participants continue to be influenced after round 2 but this influence is lightened. Fig. 1-C
shows the discrepancy between the cumulated distribution functions over rounds.
Model Performance
Prediction scenarios When one wishes to predict how a participant revises their opinion
in a decision making process, the level of prediction accuracy will highly depend on data
availability. More prior knowledge on the participant should improve the predictions. When
little prior information is available about the participant, the influenceability derived from it will
be unreliable and may lead to poor predictions. In this case, it may be more efficient to proceed
to a classification procedure provided that data from other participants are available. These
approaches are tested by computing the prediction accuracy in several situations reflecting data
availability scenarios.
In the worst case scenario, no data is available on the participant and the judgment revision
mechanism is assumed to be unknown. In this case, predicting constant opinions over time is
the only option. This corresponds to the null model against which the consensus model (1) is
compared.
In a second scenario, prior data from the same participant is available. The consensus model
can then be fitted to the data (individual influenceability method). Data ranging from 1 to
15 prior instances of the judgment process are respectively used to learn how the participant
revises their opinion. Predictions are assessed in each of these cases to test how the predictions
are impacted by the amount of prior data available.
In a final scenario, besides having access to prior data from the participant, it is assumed
that a large body of participants took part in a comparable judgment making process. These
additional data are expected to reveal the most common behaviours in the population and
enable to derive typical influenceabilities by classification tools (population influenceability
methods). For the population influenceability methods, there are two possibilities. First, assume
that prior information on the participant is available. In this case, the influenceability class of
the participant is determined using this information. In the alternative case, no prior data is
available on the targeted participant. It is then impossible to discriminate which influenceability
class they belong to. Instead, the most typical influenceability is computed for the entire
population and the participant is predicted to follow this most typical behaviour.
Prediction accuracy We assess the predictions when the number of training data is reduced,
accounting for realistic settings where prior knowledge on individuals is scarce. Individual
parameter estimation via the individual influenceability method is compared to population
influenceability method. This last method uses one or two (α(1), α(2)) couples of values derived
on independent experiments. Fig. 2 presents the RMSE (normalized to the range 0-100)
obtained on validation sets for final round predictions using the model (1) with parameters
fitted on training data of varying size. The methodology was also assessed for second round
predictions instead of final round predictions. The results also hold in this alternative case, as
described in Second round predictions section in Material and Methods.
The individual influenceability and population influenceability methods are compared to a
null model assuming constant opinion with no influence, i.e., α(r) = 0 (Null in Fig. 2). The null
model does not depend on training set size. By contrast, the individual influenceability method
which, for each individual, fits parameters αi(1) and αi(2) based on training data, is sensitive
to training set size (Individual α in Fig. 2) : it performs better than the null model when the
number of games used for training is higher than 5 in both types of games but its predictions
become poorer otherwise, due to overfitting.
Overfitting is alleviated using the population influenceability methods which restrict the
choice of α(1) and α(2), making it robust to training size variations. The population method
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Figure 2. Root mean square error (RMSE) of the predictions for the final
round. The RMSEs are obtained from crossvalidation. (A) gauging game, (B) counting
game. In (B), the RMSE has been scaled by a factor of 5 to be comparable to the (A)
plot. The bar chart displays crossvalidation errors for models that does not depend on
the training size. Top blue horizontal line corresponds to the null model of constant
opinion. The middle horizontal green line corresponds to fitting using the same typical
couple of influenceability for the whole population. The bottom horizontal red line
corresponds to the prediction error due to intrinsic variations in judgment revision.
The decreasing black curve (triangle dots) corresponds to fitting with the individual
influenceability method. The slightly decreasing orange curve (round dots) corresponds
to fitting choosing among 2 typical couples of influenceability. All RMSE were obtained
on validation games. The error bars provide 95% confidence intervals for the RMSEs.
which uses only one typical couple of influenceability as predictor presents one important
advantage. It provides a method which does not require any prior knowledge about the
participant targeted for prediction. It is thus insensitive to training set size (Cons in Fig. 2).
This method improves by 31% and 18% the prediction error for the two types of games compared
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to the null model of constant opinion.
The population methods based on two or more typical couples of influenceability require to
possess at least one previous game by the participant to calibrate the model (2 typical α in
Fig. 2). These methods are more powerful than the former if enough data is available regarding
the participant’s past behaviour (2 or 3 previous games depending on the type of games). The
number of typical couples of influenceabilities to use depends on the data availability regarding
the targeted participant. This is illustrated in Fig. 3. The modification obtained using more
typical influenceabilities for calibration is mild. Moreover, too many typical influenceabilities
may lead to poorer predictions due to overfitting. This threshold is reached for 4 couples of
influenceabilities in the gauging game data. As a consequence, it is advisable to restrict the
choice to 2 or 3 couples of influenceabilities. This analysis shows that possessing data from
previous participants in a similar task is often critical to obtain robust predictions on judgment
revision of a new participant.
(A) Gauging (B) Counting
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Figure 3. Predictive power of the consensus model when the number of
typical couples of influenceability used for model calibration varies. Root
mean square error (RMSE) plotted for training set size from 1 to 15 games. (A) gauging
game, (B) counting game. In (B), RMSE has been scaled by a factor of 5 to be comparable
to the (A) plot.
The results of the control experiments are displayed by a red dashed line in Fig. 2-A,B.
This bottom line corresponds to the amount of prediction error which is due to the intrinsic
unpredictability of judgment revision. No model can make better predictions than this threshold
(see Control experiment section in Material and Methods).
The gauging game obtains an unpredictable RMSE of 5.35 while the counting game obtains
8.23. By contrast, the average square variation of the judgments between first and final rounds
are respectively 11.76 and 11.84 for both types of games (corresponding to the RMSE of the
null model). Taking the intrinsic unpredictable variation thresholds as a reference, the relative
prediction RMSE is more than halved when using the time varying influenceability model (1)
with one couple of typical influenceabilities instead of the null model with constant opinion. In
other words, more than two thirds of the prediction error made by the consensus model is due
to the intrinsic unpredictability of the decision revision process.
The error bars in Fig. 2 provide 95% confidence intervals for the RMSEs. They confirms
statistical significance of the difference between RMSEs. For clarity, the error bars are provided
only for regression methods which do not depend on training set size. For completeness,
supplementary Fig. S3 provides error bars for all models.
RMSEs were used in this study since it corresponds to the quantity being minimized when
computing the influenceability parameter α. Alternatively, reporting the Mean Absolute Errors
(MAEs) may help the reader to obtain more intuition on the level of prediction error. For this
reason, MAEs are provided in supplementary Fig. S4.
Practical Implications of the Model
Do groups reach consensus ? Because of social influence, groups tend to reduce their
disagreement. However, this does not necessarily implies that groups reach consensus. To
test how much disagreement remains after the social process, the distance between individual
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judgments and mean judgments in corresponding groups is computed at each rounds. The
results are presented for the gauging game. The same conclusions also hold for the counting
game. Fig. 4 presents the statistics summary of these distances. The median distances are
respectively 5.5, 4.2 and 3.5 for the three successive rounds, leading to a median distance
reduction of 24% from round 1 to 2 and 16% from round 2 to 3. In other words, the contraction
of opinion diversity is less important between rounds 2 and 3 than between rounds 1 and 2 and
more than 50% of the initial opinion diversity is preserved at round 3. This is in accordance to
the influenceability decay observed in Influenceability of participants section.
If one goes a step further and assumes that the contraction continues to lessen at the same
rate over rounds, it may be that groups will never reach consensus. This phenomenon is quite
remarkable since it would explain the absence of consensus without requiring non-linearities in
social influence. An experiment involving an important number of rounds would shed light on
this question and is left for future work.
0
10
20
d = 5.5
d = 4.2
d = 3.5
Distance to the mean (d)
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3
Figure 4. Distance of participants’ judgment to mean judgment for rounds
1, 2 and 3 in the gauging game. Is displayed only the data coming from games where
for all 3 rounds at least 5 out of 6 participants provided a judgment. This ensures that
the judgment mean and standard deviation can be compared over rounds.
Influenceability and individual performance Each game is characterized by a true
value, corresponding to an exact proportion to guess (for gauging games) or an exact amount of
items displayed to the participants (for counting games). Whether social influence promotes or
undermines individual performance can be measured for the two tasks. Individual performance
can also be compared to the performance of the mean opinions in each group of 6 participants.
At each round r, a participant’s success is characterized by the root mean square distance
to truth, denoted Ei(r). The error Ei(r) depicts how far a participant is to truth. Errors are
normalized to fit in the range 0− 100 in both types of tasks so as to be comparable. A global
measure of individual errors is defined as the median over participants of Ei(r), and the success
variation between two rounds is given by the median value of the differences Ei(r)− Ei(r + 1).
A positive or negative success variation corresponds respectively to a success improvement or
decline of the participants after social interaction. The errors are displayed in Fig. 5. The
results are first reported for the gauging game. The median error Ei(r) for rounds 1, 2 and
3 are respectively 11.9, 10.0 and 9.8 (Fig. 5-(A)). It reveals an improvement with a success
variation of 1.9 and 0.2 for Ei(1)− Ei(2) and Ei(2)− Ei(3) respectively (p-values< 10E − 5,
sign test), showing that most of the improvement is made between first and second round.
Regarding the counting game, the median error Ei(r) for rounds 1, 2 and 3 are respectively
23.1, 22.1 and 21.6 (Fig. 5-(B)). Note that the errors for the counting game have been rescaled
by a factor of 5 to fit in the range 0− 100. This corresponds to an improvement with a success
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variation of 1.0 and 0.5 for Ei(1) − Ei(2) and Ei(2) − Ei(3) respectively (the significance of
the improvement is confirmed by a sign-test with p-values < 10E − 5). Fig. 5 also reports
the aggregate performance in terms of the root mean square distance from mean opinions to
truth in each group of 6 participants. Unlike individual performance, the median aggregate
performance does not consistently improve. Regarding the gauging game, the median aggregate
error is significantly higher in round 1 than in rounds 2 and 3 (p-val< 10E − 4, sign test) and
this difference is not significant between rounds 2 and 3 (p-val> 0.05). Regarding the counting
game, no significant difference is found among the 3 rounds for the median aggregate error
(p-val> 0.05). As a consequence, social influence consistently helps the individual performance
but does not consistently promote the aggregate performance.
The reason why social influence helps the individual performance is a combination of two
factors. First, at round 1, the mean opinion is closer to the truth than the individual opinion is
(p-val< 0.01, Mann–Whitney–Wilcoxon test). Second, in accordance to the consensus model (1),
individuals move closer to the mean opinion over subsequent rounds. The fact that initially
the mean opinion is closer to truth than the individual opinions corresponds to the wisdom of
the crowd effect. The wisdom of the crowd is a statistical effect stating that averaging over
several independent judgments yields a more accurate evaluation than most of the individual
judgments would (see the early ox experiment by Galton in 1907 [40] or more recent work [41]).
Since the aggregate performance does not consistently improve over rounds, it can be said that
social influence does not consistently promote the wisdom of the crowd. Lorenz et al. [4] say
that social influence undermines the wisdom of the crowd because it “reduces the diversity
of the group without improving its accuracy”. This variance reduction is also observed in the
present study and corroborates the consensus model (1). Interestingly, in the first round, the
wisdom of the crowd effect is more prominent in the gauging game than in the counting game:
the median individual error is 37% higher than the median error of the mean opinion in the
gauging game while it is only 8% higher in the counting game. The reason for this difference is
studied in details in supplementary section S2.
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Figure 5. (A) gauging game; (B) counting game. From left to right : (Boxplot 1,3
and 5, in blue) Root mean square distance from individual opinions to truth (Ei(r));
(Boxplot 2,4 and 6 in red) Root mean square distance from mean opinion to truth.
Values shown for the counting game have been scaled by a factor of 5.
The fact that the mean opinion is more accurate than individual opinions leads to posit
that participants using the mean opinion to form their own opinion, i.e., those with higher
influenceability αi, will increase their performance. We examine relationships between success
variation and the model parameters αi by computing partial Pearson correlations ρ controlling
for the effect of the rest of the variables. Only significant Pearson correlations are mentioned
(p-val < 0.05). All corresponding p-values happen to be smaller than 0.001 except for one as
explicitly mentioned. Pearson correlations are given by pairs : the first value corresponds to
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the gauging game while the second to the counting game. Influenceability αi(1) between round
1 and 2 and improvement are positively related with ρ(αi(1), Ei(1)− Ei(2)) = 0.41/0.22. This
is in accordance to the posited hypothesis. The wisdom of the crowd effect found at round
1 implies that participants who improve more from round 1 to 2 are those who give more
weight to the average judgment. Since the wisdom of the crowd effect is more prominent in the
gauging game than in the counting game, it is consistent that the correlation is higher in the
former than in the latter. A similar effect relates success improvement and the influenceability
αi(2) between round 2 and 3 with ρ(αi(2) , Ei(2)− Ei(3)) = 0.36/0.32. As may be expected,
higher initial success leaves less room for improvement in subsequent rounds, which explains
that ρ(Ei(1), Ei(1)−Ei(2)) = 0.68/0.21 and ρ(Ei(1), Ei(2)−Ei(3)) = 0.25/0.16 (where 0.16 is
significant for p-val < 0.01). This also means that initially better participants are not better
than average at using external judgments.
Modelling influenceability across different types of games The assessment of
the predictive power of model (1) on both types of games provides a generalisability test of the
prediction method. The two types of games vary in difficulty. The root mean square relative
distance Ei(1) between a participant’s first round judgment and truth is taken as the measure
of inaccuracy for each participant. The median inaccuracy for the counting game is 23.1 while
it is 11.8 for the gauging game (Mood’s median test supports the rejection of equal median,
p = 0). Moreover, a Q-Q plot shows that inaccuracy is more dispersed for the counting game,
suggesting that estimating quantities is more difficult than gauging proportion of colors.
The accuracy of model (1) is compared for the two datasets in Fig. 2. Interestingly, the
model prediction ranks remains largely unchanged for the two types of games. As depicted
in Fig. 1-C, influenceability distributions do not vary significantly between the two games. A
two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test fails to reject the equality of distribution null hypothesis
of equal median with p > 0.65 and a KS distance of 0.06 for both αi(1) and αi(2). This means
that although the participants have an increased difficulty when facing the counting game,
they do not significantly modify how much they take judgments from others into account.
Additionally, the relationships between participants’ success and influenceability are preserved
for both types of games. The preserved tendencies corroborate the overall resemblance of
behaviours across the two types of games. These similarities indicate that the model can be
applied to various types of games with different level of difficulty.
Conclusions
The way online social systems are designed has an important effect on judgment outcome [42].
Operating or acting on these online social systems provides a way to significantly impact our
markets, politics [43] and health. Understanding the social mechanisms underlying opinion
revision is critical to plan successful interventions in social networks. It will help to promote
the adoption of innovative behaviours (e.g., quit smocking [44], eat healthy) [45]. The design
and validation of models of opinion revision will enable to create a bridge between system
engineering and network science [46].
The present work shows that it is possible to model opinion evolution in the context of
social influence in a predictive way. When the data regarding a new participant is available,
parameters best representing their influenceability are derived using mean-square minimization.
When the data is scarce, the data from previous participants is used to predict how the new
participant will revise their judgments. To validate our method, results were compared for two
types of games varying in difficulty. The model performs similarly in the two experiments,
indicating that our influenceability model can be applied to other situations.
The decaying influenceability model after being fit to the data suggests that despite opinion
settlement, consensus will not be reached within groups and disagreement will remain. This
suggests that there needs to be incentives for a group to reach a consensus. The analysis
also reveals that participants who improve more are those with highest influenceability, this
independently of their initial success.
The degree to which one may successfully intervene on a social system is directly linked to
the degree of predictability of opinion revision. Because there must always be factors which fall
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out of the researcher’s reach (changing mood or motivations of participants), part of the process
cannot be predicted. The present study provides way to assess the level of unpredictability of
an opinion revision mechanism. This assessment is based on a control experiment with hidden
replicated tasks.
The proposed experiment type and validation method can in principle be generalized to any
sort of continuous judgment revision. The consensus model can also serve as a building block
to more complex models when collective judgments rely on additional information exchange.
Material and Methods
Experiment
Our research is based on an experimental website that we built, which received participants
from a crowdsourcing platform. When a participant took part in an experiment, they joined a
group of 6 participants. Their task was to successively play 30 games of the same sort related
to 30 distinct pictures.
Criteria for online judgment revision game The games were designed to reveal how
opinions evolve as a result of online social influence. Suitable games have to satisfy several
constraints. First, to finely quantify influence, the games ought to allow the evolution of opinion
to be gradual. Numbers were chosen as the way for participant to communicate their opinion.
Multiple choice questions with a list of unordered items (e.g., choosing among a list of holiday
locations) were discarded. Along the same lines, the evolution of opinion requires uncertainty
and diversity of a sufficient magnitude in the initial judgments. The games were chosen to
be sufficiently difficult to obtain this diversity. Thirdly, to encourage serious behaviours, the
participants were rewarded based on their success in the games. This required the accuracy of
a participant to be computable. Games were selected to have an ideal opinion or truth which
served as a reference. Subjective questions involving for instance political or religious opinions
were discarded.
Additionally, the game had to satisfy two other constraints related to the online context
where, unlike face-to-face experiments, the researcher cannot control behavioural trustworthiness.
Since the educational and cultural background of participants is a priori unknown, the game
had to be accessible, i.e., any person which could read English had to be able to understand and
complete the game. As a result, the games had to be as simple as possible. For instance, games
could not involve high-level mathematical computations. Despite being simple to understand
our games were still quite difficult to solve, in accordance with the first constraint. Lastly,
to anticipate the temptation to cheat, the solution to the games had to be absent from the
Internet. Therefore, questions such as estimating the population of a country were discarded.
Gauging and counting games Each game was associated with a picture. In the gauging
game, the pictures were composed of 3 colors and participants estimated the percentage as a
number between 0 and 100 of the same given color in the picture. In the counting game, the
picture was composed of between 200 and 500 many small items, so that the participant could
not count the items one by one. The participants had then to evaluate the total number of
these items as a number between 0 and 500. A game was composed of 3 rounds. The picture
was kept the same for all 3 rounds. In each round, the participant had to make a judgment.
During the first round, each of the 6 participants provided their judgment, independently of
the other participants. During the second round, each participant anonymously received all
other judgments from the first round and provided their judgment again. The third round was
a repetition of the second one. Accuracy of all judgments were converted to a monetary bonus
to encourage participants to improve their judgment at each round. Screenshots of the games’
interface are provided in the Design of the Experiment section.
Design of the experiment The present section describes the experiment interface. A
freely accessible single player version of the games was also developed to provide a first hand
experience of the games. In the single player version, participants are exposed to judgments
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stored on our database obtained from real participant in previous games. The single player
version is freely accessible at http://collective-intelligence.cran.univ-lorraine.fr/eg/login. The
interface and the timing of the single player version is the same as the version used in the
control experiment. The only difference is that the freely accessible version does not involve
redundant games and provides accuracy feedback to the participants.
In the multi-player version which was used for the uncontrolled experiment, the participants
came from the CrowdFlower® external crowdsourcing platform where they received the URL
of the experiment login page along with a keycode to be able to login. The ad we posted on
CrowdFlower was as follows :
Estimation game regarding color features in images
You will be making estimations about features in images. Beware that this game is
a 6-player game. If not enough people access the game, you will not be able to start
and get rewarded. To start the game : click on <estimation-game> and login using
the following information :
login : XXXXXXXX
password: XXXXXXXX
You will receive detailed instruction there. At the end of the game you will receive
a reward code which you must enter below in order to get rewarded :
< >
The participants were told they will be given another keycode at the end of the experiment which
they had to use to get rewarded on the crowdsourcing platform, this forced the participants to
finish the experiment if they wanted to obtain a payment. Secondly, the participants arrived on
the experiment login page, chose a login name and password so they could come back using the
same login name if they wanted to for another experiment (see supplementary Fig. S5). Once
they had logged in, they were requested to agree on a consent form mentioning the preservation
of the anonymity of the data (see the Consent and privacy section below for details). Thirdly,
the participants were taken to a questionnaire regarding personality, gender, highest level of
education, and whether they were native English speaker or not (all the experiment was written
in English). The questions regarding personality come from a piece of work by Gosling and
Rentfrow [39] and were used to estimate the five general personality traits. The questionnaire
page is reported in supplementary Fig. S6. Once the questionnaire submitted, the participants
have access to the detailed instructions on the judgment process (supplementary supplementary
Fig. S7). After this step, they were taken to a waiting room until 6 participants had arrived at
this step. At this point, they started the series of 30 games which appeared 3 at a time, with one
lone round where they had to make judgments alone and two social rounds where the provided
judgment being aware of judgments from others. An instance of the lone round is given in
supplementary Fig. S8-(A) for the counting game while a social round is shown in supplementary
Fig. S9. Instances of pictures for the gauging game are provided in supplementary Fig. S8-(B).
In the gauging game, the question was replaced by “What percentage of the following color do
you see in the image ?”. For this type of games, a sample of the color to be gauged for each
pictures was displayed between the question and the 3 pictures. At the end of the 30 games, the
participants had access to a debrief page where was given the final score and the corresponding
bonus. They could also provide a feedback in a text box. They had to provide their email
address if they wanted to obtain the bonus (see supplementary Fig. S10).
Consent and privacy Before starting the experiment, participants had to agree electroni-
cally on a consent form mentioning the preservation of the anonymity of the data :
Hello! Thank you for participating in this experiment. You will be making estima-
tions about features in images. The closer your answers are to the correct answer,
the higher reward you will receive. Your answers will be used for research on per-
sonality and behaviour in groups. We will keep complete anonymity of participants
at all time. If you consent you will first be taken to a questionnaire. Then, you
will get to a detailed instruction page you should read over before starting the game.
Do you understand and consent to the terms of the experiment explained above ? If
so click on I agree below.
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In this way, participants were aware that the data collected from their participation were to
be be used for research on personality and behaviour in groups. IP addresses were collected.
Email addresses were asked. Email addresses were only used to send participants bonuses via
Paypal® according to their score in the experiments. IP addresses were used solely to obtained
the country of origin of the participants. Behaviours were analyzed anonymously. Information
collected on the participants were not used in any other way than the one presented in the
manuscript and were not distributed to any third party. Personality, gender and country of
origin presented no correlation with influenceability or any other quantity reported in the
manuscript. The age of participants was not collected. Only adults are allowed to carry out
microtasks on the CrowdFlower platform : CrowdFlower terms and conditions include : "you
are at least 18 years of age". The experiment was declared to the Belgian Privacy Comission
(https://www.privacycommission.be/) as requested by law. The French INSERM IRB read the
consent procedure and confirmed that their approval was not required for this study since the
data were analyzed anonymously.
Control experiment Human judgment is such a complex process that no model can take
all its influencing factors into account. The precision of the predictions is limited by the intrinsic
variation in the human judgment process. To represent this degree of unpredictability, we
consider the variation in the judgment revision process that would occur if a participant were
exposed to two replicated games in which the set of initial judgments happened to be identical.
A control experiment served to measure this degree of unpredictability.
To create replicated experimental conditions, the judgments of five out of the six partic-
ipants were synthetically designed. The only human participant in the group was not made
aware of this, so they would act as in the uncontrolled experiments. Practically, partici-
pants took part in 30 games, among these, 20 games had been designed to form 10 pairs of
replicated games with an identical picture used in both games of a pair. To make sure the
participants did not notice the presence of replicates, the remaining 10 games were distributed
between the replicates. The order of appearance of the games with replicates is as follows :
1,2, 11|3,4, 12|6, 13,5|14,7,8|9,1, 15|4,10, 16|2,6, 17|7, 18,3|8,5, 19|10,9, 20, where games 1
to 10 are the replicated games. The games successively appeared three at a time from left
to right. The 15 synthetic judgments (5 participants over 3 rounds) which appeared in the
first instance of a pair of replicates were copies of past judgment made by real participants
in past uncontrolled experiments. The copied games collected in uncontrolled experiments
were randomly selected among the games in which more than 5 participants had provided
judgments. Since the initial judgment of the real participant could not be controlled, the 15
synthetic judgments in the second replicate had to be shifted in order to maintain constant the
initial judgment distances in each replicate. The shift was computed in real time to match the
variation of the real participant initial judgments between the two replicates. The same shift
was applied to all rounds to keep the synthetic judgments consistent over rounds (see Fig. 6 for
the illustration of the shifting process). This provided exactly the same set of initial judgments
up to a constant shift in each pair of replicated games. Such an experimental setting allowed
assessing the degree of unpredictability in judgment revision (see the Prediction accuracy section
in Results for details).
Participants
Uncontrolled experiment The data were collected during July, September and October
2014. Overall, 654 distinct participants took part in the study (310 in the gauging game only,
308 in the counting game only and 36 in both). In total, 64 groups of 6 participants completed
a gauging game, while 71 groups of 6 participants completed a counting game. According to
their IP addresses, participants came from 70 distinct countries. Participants mostly originated
from 3 continents : 1/3 from Asia, 1/2 from Europe and 1/6 from South America. As detailed
at the end of the paragraph, most participants completed most of the 30 games and played
trustworthfully. The others were ignored from the study via two systematic filters. First, since
the prediction method was tested using up to 15 games in the model parameter estimation
process, the predictions reported in present study concern only the participants who completed
more than 15 out of the 30 games. This ensures that the number of games used for parameter
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Figure 6. Illustration of the shift applied to the synthetic judgment in order
to preserve the distances between initial judgments. The shift made by the
participant in the first round was synthetically applied to all other initial judgments.
The intrinsic variation in judgment revision is the distance between second round
judgments, reduced by the shift in initial judgments. The dotted cross is not a judgment
and is only displayed to show how the second round intrinsic variation is computed using
the initial shift. All shifts are equal. The same shift is also applied to all other second
round judgments, and used to compute final round intrinsic variations.
estimations is homogeneous over all participants. The prediction performance can then be
compared among participants. The median number of fully completed games per participants
was 24 with 10.5 std for the gauging game and 27 with 10.5 std for the counting game. Lower
numbers are possibly due to loss of interest in the task or connexion issues. The first filter
lead to keep 68% of the participants for the gauging game and 71% for the counting game (see
Fig. 7–A,C for details). Secondly, the prediction were only made on judgments of trustworthy
participants. Trustworthiness was computed via correlation between participant’s judgments and
true answers. Most participants carried out the task truthworthfully with a median correlation
of 0.85 and median absolute deviation (MAD) of 0.09 for the gauging game and 0.70 median and
0.09 MAD for the counting game. A few participants either played randomly or systematically
entered the same aberrant judgment. A minimum Pearson correlation thresholds of 0.61 for
the gauging game and 0.24 for the counting game were determined using Iglewicz and Hoaglin
method based on median absolute deviation [47]. The difference between the two thresholds is
due to the higher difficulty of the counting game as expressed by the difference between median
correlations. This lead to keep 91% and 96% of the participants which had passed the first
filter (see Fig. 7–B,D for details).
It should be acknowledged that the selection procedure may have lead to sample bias. This
could be due to self-selection : some people choose to participate in the experiment and others
do not. The fact that the study was carried out online is another factor that could bias the
sample. The a posteriori filters may be another source of bias. These are common issues in
the behavioural sciences. Possibly, the nature of the study will have appealed to certain types
of people and not others. Although that could have biased the characteristics of the sample,
we are unaware of any empirical evidence suggesting that people who like participating in this
kind of tasks are more or less susceptible to social influence.
Control experiment The data were collected during May and June 2015. Overall, 207
distinct participants took part in the study (113 in the gauging game only, 87 in the counting
game only and 7 in both). The 120 gauging game participants took part in 139 independent
games while the 94 counting game participants were involved in 99 independent games. Each
independent game was completed by 5 synthetic participants to form groups of 6. The same
filters as those used in the uncontrolled experiment were applied to the participants in the
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Figure 7. Filters for participants’ trustworthiness. (A),(C) gauging game, (B),(D)
counting game. (A,B) : Histograms of the number of full games played by participants.
(C,D) : Histograms of the correlations between judgments and true values for each
participant. Rejected participants are displayed in red while kept participants are in
blue, to the right of the black arrow.
control experiment. This lead to keep 88% of the counting games and 80% of the gauging games.
Opinion revision model
To capture the way individual opinions evolve during a collective judgment process, a consensus
model is used. These models have a long history in social science [38] and their behaviour
has been thoroughly analyzed in a theoretical way [48,49]. Our model (1) assumes that when
an individual sees a set of opinions, their opinion changes linearly in the distance between
their opinion and the mean of the group opinions. There is recent evidence supporting this
assumption [7]. See also supplementary section S3 for a test of the validity of the linearity
assumption. The rate of opinion change as a result of social influence is termed the influenceability
of a participant. The model also assumes that this influenceability may vary over time. The
decrease of influenceability represents opinion settling. The model is described in mathematical
terms in equation (1), with αi(r) being the influenceability of participant i after round r.
When αi(1) is nonzero, the ratio αi(2)/αi(1) represents the decaying rate of influenceability.
Parameters αi(1) and αi(2) are to be estimated to fit the model to the data. It is expected that
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αi(1), αi(2) ∈ [0, 1]. If αi(r) = 0, the participant does not take into account the others and their
opinion remains constant. If αi(r+ 1) = αi(r), the influenceability does not change in time and
the opinion xi(t) eventually converges to the mean opinion x¯. Instead, if αi(r + 1)/αi(r) < 1,
influenceability starts positive but decays over time, which represents opinion settling.
There exist several variations to the linear consensus model presented above. In particular,
the bounded confidence models [50,51] assume that the influenceability αi(t) also depends on the
distance between one’s opinion and the influencing opinion. Alternatively, the model by Friedkin
and Johnsen [52] assumes that individuals always remain influenced by their initial opinion or
prejudice over time. Rather than providing an exhaustive assessment of the alternative models
found in the literature, the objective of the present study is to show how the predictive power
of a simple model of opinion dynamics can be assessed and to estimate the minimal prediction
error that one can expect for any opinion dynamics model.
Consensus models of opinion dynamics are well adapted to represent opinions evolving
in a continuous space. This corresponds to many real world situations in which the opinion
represents the inclinaison between two extreme opposite options such as left and right in politics.
Alternatively, part of the literature consider models with binary choices or actions (e.g., voting
for one candidates, buying a car or going on strikes). These discrete choice models include the
rumour [53] and threshold models [54, 55]. In the latter, an individual changes their action
when a certain proportion of its neighbours does so. These models directly link the discrete
action of an individual to the actions in their neighbourhood. This allows to describe cascade
propagation of behaviours. Presumably, before someone changes their actions, their opinion
had to change as a result of the social stimuli. A recent model bridges these two bulks of work,
considering the social influence of discrete actions on continuous opinions (the CODA model)
which itself results in an individual action [56]. It appears that this model also naturally leads
to cascade of behaviours over a social network [57]. It would be interesting to see how the
threshold parameter in Granovetter’s model may be expressed in terms of the initial opinion of
individual in the CODA model : individuals with an opinion close to the boundary leading to
either of the two discrete actions would have a lower threshold for action change.
The past two decades have witnessed a few attempts to confront simple models of opinion
dynamics to real world data on collective human behaviours. These include conflicts and
controversies on Wikipedia [58, 59] or how voters distribute their votes among candidates in
elections [60–62]. However, since individual opinions involved in real world processes are not
directly available, researchers had to calibrate their models on global measures such as level
of controversy or distribution of votes. Moreover, the predictive power of these models was
not assessed : the data used to calibrate the models also served to validate them. In vitro
studies such as the present one have the advantage of providing the micro-level data driving
the collective dynamics. Another advantage of in vitro studies is the possibility to differentiate
social influence from other confounding factors such as homophily thanks to the anonymity of
influencing individuals (see also [63,64]).
Prediction procedure
Regression procedure The goal of the procedure is to predict the future judgment of a
given participant in a given game. The set of first round judgments of this game are supposed
to be known to initialize the model (1), this includes the initial judgment from the participant
targeted for prediction and the initial judgments from the five other participants who possibly
influenced the former.
To tune the model, prior games from the same participant are assumed to be available.
These data serve to estimate the influenceability parameters αi(1) and αi(2). In one scenario,
the influenceability parameters of the participant are estimated independently of the data from
other participants (individual influenceability method). This is the only feasible method
when no prior data on other participants is available (see the Prediction scenarios section
in Results for details on the data availability scenarios). In this first case, parameters αi(1)
and αi(2) are determined using a mean square error minimization procedure (this procedure
amounts to likelihood maximization when the errors between model predictions and actual
judgments are normally distributed and have zero mean, see for instance [65, p27]).
In situations where the number of prior games available to estimate the influenceability
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parameters is small, little information is available on the participant’s past behaviour. This
may result in unreliable parameter estimates. To cope with such situations, another scenario
is considered : besides having access to prior data from the targeted participant, part of the
remaining participants (half of them, in our study) are used to derive the typical influenceabilities
in the population. The expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm is used to classify the
population into groups of similar influenceabilities [65]. These typical influenceabilities serve as
a pool of candidates. The prior games of the targeted participant are used to determine which
candidate yields the smallest mean square error (population influenceability method). The
procedure to determine which typical candidate best suits a participant requires less knowledge
than the one to accurately estimate their influenceability without a prior knowledge on its value
(see the results in the Prediction accuracy section in Results).
Validation procedure The three scenarios presented in the Prediction scenarios section
in Results are validated via crossvalidation. The validation procedure of the last scenario (i.e.,
access to prior data from participants, existence and access to typical influenceabilities) starts
by randomly splitting the set of participants into two equal parts. The prediction focuses on
one of the two halves while the remaining half is used to derive the typical influenceabilities in
the population influenceability method. In the half serving for prediction, our model is assessed
via repeated random sub-sampling crossvalidation : for each participant, a training subset of
the games is used to assign the appropriate typical influenceabilities to each participant. The
rest of the games serves as the validation set to compute the root mean square error (RMSE)
between the observed data and predictions. The error specific to participant i is denoted as
RMSEi. The results are compared for various training set sizes. The RMSE is obtained from
averaging errors over 300 iterations using a different randomly selected training set each time.
To compare scenarios 1 and 2 with scenario 3, we only consider the half serving for prediction.
Scenario 1 (no data available) does not require any training step. For scenario 2 (access to
prior data from participants), instead of learning affectation of typical influenceabilities to each
participant, the learning process directly estimates the influenceabilities αi(1) and αi(2) for
each participant without prior assumption on their values. The whole validation process is
also carried out reversing the role of the two halves of the population and a global RMSE is
computed out of the entire process.
Intrinsic unpredictability estimation
Unpredictability of the second round judgment Even though the study mainly
focuses on the predictions of third round judgments, we first focus in the present section on the
two first rounds of the games, for the sake of clarity. The prediction procedure can easily be
adapted to predict second round rather than third round judgments. Results for second round
predictions based on the consensus model (1) are presented in Second round predictions section
below.
The control experiment described in Control experiment section provides a way of estimating
the intrinsic variations in the human judgment process. When a participant takes part in a
game, their actual second judgment depends on several factors : their own initial judgment
xi(1), the vector of initial judgments from other participants denoted as xothers(1) and the
displayed picture. As a consequence, the second round judgment of a participant can always be
written as
xi(2) = f1i (xi(1), xothers(1), picture) + η, (2)
where f1i describes how a participant revises their judgment in average depending on their
initial judgment and external factors. The term picture is the influence of the picture on the
final judgment. The quantity η captures the intrinsic variation made by a participant when
making their second round judgment despite having made the same initial judgment and being
exposed to the same set of judgments and identical picture. Formally η is a random variable
with zero mean. This is shown in supplementary section S1.1. The standard deviation of η is
assumed to be the same for all participants to the same game, denoted as std(η). The standard
deviation std(η) measures the root mean square error between f1i and the actual judgment
xi(2) ; this error measures by definition the intrinsic unpredictability of the judgment revision
process. If it was known, the function f1i would provide the best prediction regarding judgment
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revision. By definition, no other model can be more precise. The function f1i is unknown, but
it is reasonable to make the following assumptions. First, the function f1i is assumed to be a
sum of (i) the influence of the initial judgments and and (ii) the influence of the picture. Thus
f1i splits into two components :
f1i (xi(1), xothers(1), picture) =
λg1i (xi(1), xothers(1)) + (1− λ)h1i (picture),
where g1i represents the dependence of the second round judgment on past judgments while h1i
contains the dependency regarding the picture. The parameter λ ∈ [0, 1] weights the relative
importance of the first term compared to the second and is considered unique for each particular
type of game. It is further assumed that if the initial judgment xi(1) and the others judgment
at round 1 are shifted by a constant shift, the g1i component in the second round judgment will
on average be shifted in the same way, in other words, it is possible to write
g1i (xi(1) + s, xothers(1) + s) = g1i (xi(1), xothers(1)) + s,
where s is a constant shift applied to the judgments. Under this assumption, the control
experiment provides a way of measuring the intrinsic variation. The intrinsic variation estimation
std(η) can be empirically measured as the root mean of
1
2(x
′
i(2)− xi(2)− λ(x′i(1)− xi(1)))2 (3)
over all repeated games and all participants, where the prime notation is taken for judgments
from the second replicated game in the control experiment (see Participants section in Material
and Methods. The derivation of equation (3) is provided in supplementary section S4. Since η
is assumed to have zero mean, the function fi properly describing the actual judgment revision
process is the one minimizing std(η). Correspondingly, the constant λ ∈ [0, 1] is set so as to
satisfy this minimization. The intrinsic variation estimation std(η) is displayed in Fig. 8. The
optimal λ values are found to be 0.67 and 0.74 and correspond to intrinsic unpredictability
estimations of 5.38 and 7.36 for the gauging game and the counting game, respectively. These
thresholds can be used to assess the quality of the predictions for the second round (see Second
round predictions section).
Unpredictability of the final round judgment The procedure to estimate third
round intrinsic unpredictability, whose results are shown in Fig. 2, varies slightly from second
round estimation procedure. For third round judgments, a function with the same input as f1i ,
depending only on the initial judgments and the picture, cannot properly describe the judgment
revision of one participant independently of the other participant’s behaviour. In fact, the
third round judgments depend on the second round judgments of others, which results from the
revision process of other players. In other words, in a situation where a participant were to be
faced successively to two groups of other participants, who by chance had given an identical set
of initial judgments, the second round judgments of the two groups could vary due to distinct
ways of revising their judgments.
Since the initial judgments does not suffice in describing third round judgments, function
f1i is modified to take the second round judgments of others xothers(2) as an additional input.
Then, the control experiment provides a way to estimate the intrinsic variations occurring in
judgment revision up to the third round. This is described formally in the rest of the section.
However, it should be noted that this description of judgment revision does not strictly speaking
provide the exact degree of intrinsic variation included in the final round prediction error made
in the uncontrolled experiment, it is rather an under-estimation of it : The predictions via the
consensus model presented in the Prediction performance section in Results, are based solely
on the initial judgments, whereas, the second round judgment from other participants are also
provided in the present description. This additional piece of information necessarily makes the
description of third round judgment more precise. As a consequence, the intrinsic variation
estimated here (see details below) is an under-estimation of the actual intrinsic variation included
in the prediction error of the consensus model. From a practical point of view, this means that
the actual intrinsic unpredictability threshold is actually even closer to the predictions made
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Figure 8. Root mean square intrinsic variation as a function of the λ param-
eters. (A), (B) : the second round judgments, as given in equation (3). (C), (D) :
the third round judgments, as given in equation (5). (A), (C) gauging game, (B), (D)
counting game.
by the consensus model than displayed in Fig. 2. In other words, there is even less space to
improve the predictions provided by the consensus model, since more than two thirds of the
error comes from the intrinsic variation rather than from the model imperfections.
Formally, the deterministic part of the third round judgment of a participant xi(3) is fully
determined as a function of their initial judgment xi(1), the initial judgment of others xothers(1),
the second round judgment of others xothers(2) and the picture. So, the third round judgment
can be written as
xi(3) = f2i (xi(1), xothers(1), xothers(2), picture) + η¯, (4)
where η¯ is the estimation of the intrinsic variation occurring after three rounds under the same
initial judgments, same picture and same second round judgments from others. Under the same
assumptions on function f2i as those made on f1i , and analogously to equation (3), std(η¯) is
measured by the root mean of
1
2(x
′
i(3)− xi(3)− λ(x′i(1)− xi(1)))2 (5)
over all repeated games and all participants. This intrinsic variation is provided as a function
of parameter λ in Fig. 8, (C)-(D).
Second round predictions
The prediction procedure based on the consensus model (1) is applied to predict the second
round judgments. Crossvalidation allows to assess the accuracy of the model. Results are
presented in Fig. 9. These results are qualitatively equivalent to the prediction errors for the
third round as shown in Fig. 2, although the second round predictions lead to a lower RMSEs,
as expected since they correspond to shorter term predictions.
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Figure 9. Root mean square error (RMSE) of the predictions for the second
round. The RMSEs are obtained from crossvalidation. (A) gauging game, (B) counting
game. In (B), the RMSE has been scaled by a factor of 5 to be comparable to the
(A) plot. The bar chart displays crossvalidation errors for models that does not depend
on the training set size. Top blue horizontal line corresponds to the null model of
constant opinion. The middle horizontal green line correspond to fitting using the same
typical couple of influenceability for the whole population. The bottom horizontal red
line correspond to the prediction error due to intrinsic variations in judgment revision.
The decreasing black curves (triangle dots) correspond to fitting with the individual
influenceability method. The slightly decreasing orange curves (round dots) correspond
to fitting choosing among 2 typical couples of influenceability. All RMSE were obtained
on validation games.
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S1 Derivation of the measure of unpredictability
S1.1 Proof that η has zero mean
In section Intrinsic unpredictability estimation, we used that η has zero mean. This fact is proven in the
sequel. Assume, to show a contradiction that m = E(η) 6= 0. Denote x˜i(2) = f1i (xi(1), xothers(1), picture).
Then, we can show that x˜i(2) +m would be a better model for xi(2) than x˜i(2). This would contradict the
definition of f1i as the best model. Indeed, the expected square prediction error would be
E
(
(xi(2)− (x˜i(2) +m))2
)
= E
(
(xi(2)− x˜i(2))2
)
− 2mE (xi(2)− x˜i(2)) +m2
= E
(
(xi(2)− x˜i(2))2
)
−m2
< E
(
(xi(2)− x˜i(2))2
)
,
where we used the fact that η = xi(2)− x˜i(2). The same reasoning allows to show that the prediction error
η¯ at round 3 also has zero mean.
S1.2 Derivation of equation (3)
Equation (3) is derived using the following reasoning. The judgments made in two replicated games of a
control experiment by a same participants are described as
xi(2) = f1i (xi(1), xothers(1), picture) + η,
x′i(2) = f1i (x′i(1), x′others(1), picture) + η′,
where the prime notation is taken for judgments from the second replicated game and η and η′ are two
independent draws of the random intrinsic variation. By design, the set of judgments are all shifted by the
same constant :
x′i(1) = xi(1) + s,
x′others(1) = xothers(1) + s,
where s = x′i(1)− xi(1) is known. According the assumption made on function f1i ,
xi(2) = λg1i (xi(1), xothers(1)) + (1− λ)h1i (picture) + η,
x′i(2) = λg1i (x′i(1), x′others(1)) + (1− λ)h1i (picture) + η′,
the second round judgment made in the second replicate is then
x′i(2) = λ
(
g1i (xi(1), xothers(1)) + s
)
+ (1− λ)h1i (picture) + η′,
where the invariance by translation of g1i was used. Taking the difference makes the unknown terms
g1i (xi(1), xothers(1)) and h1i (picture) vanish to obtain
x′i(2)− xi(2) = λs+ η′ − η. (6)
Since η and η′ have zero mean and are assumed to have equal variance, the theoretical variance of η is
E(η2) = 12
(
E(η2) + E(η′2)
)
= 12(E(η
′2)− 2E(η′η) + E(η2) + 2E(η′η))
= 12(E(η
′2 − 2η′η + η2)) + E(η′η)
= 12E((η
′ − η)2) + E(η′η).
(7)
Moreover η and η′ are assumed to be independent with zero mean, i.e., , E(η) = E(η′) = 0, therefore,
their covariance is null : E(ηη′) = E(η)E(η′) = 0. Consequently, E(η2) = 12E((η
′−η)2) and using equation (6),
the variance of η is empirically measured as the average of
1
2(x
′
i(2)− xi(2)− λs)2
over all repeated games and all participants. This corresponds to equation (3).
S1.3 Discussion on the assumptions on η and η′
The only assumption used to derive equation (6) is that η and η′ have the same variance and are independent
for each participant. Since function f1i is unknown, it is not possible to directly test these assumptions.
However, since pairs of replicates in the control experiment are related to the same picture, it is unlikely
that the covariance between η and η′ would be negative. If the covariance was positive, the quantity
given in equation (6) would become a lower bound on the unpredictability threshold, as shown through
equation (7). Finally, if η and η′ did not satisfy the assumption of equal variance, the quantity in equation (6)
would still correspond to the average variance 12
(
E(η2) + E(η′2)
)
which also represents the average intrinsic
unpredictability, as seen in equation (7).
S2 Circumstances of the wisdom of the crowd
The wisdom of the crowds may not always occur. The present section recalls one important hypothesis
underlying the wisdom of the crowds. The hypothesis is then tested against the empirical data from the
study. In the context of the present study, the wisdom of the crowd corresponds to the following fact: the
mean opinion is most often much closer to the true answer than the individual opinions are. Denoting x¯ the
mean of n opinions xi and T the corresponding true answer, this is formally expressed as
|x¯− T | << 1
n
n∑
i=1
|xi − T |, (8)
where << stands for significantly smaller than. The wisdom of the crowd given by equation 8 does not
always take place. It only occurs if the opinions xi are distributed sufficiently symmetrically around the
true answer. When the distribution is largely biased above or below the true answer, equation 8 fails to
hold. To understand this fact, the group of individual is split in two : i ∈ N+ if xi(1) > T and i ∈ N− if
xi(1) < T . Then, the distance of the mean opinion to truth rewrites as
|x¯− T | =
∣∣∣∣∣
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
xi
)
− T
∣∣∣∣∣ = 1n
∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
i=1
(xi − T )
∣∣∣∣∣ = 1n
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑
i∈N+
(xi − T ) +
∑
i∈N−
(xi − T )
∣∣∣∣∣
= 1
n
∣∣D+ −D−∣∣
whereD+ =
∑
i∈N+ |xi−T | ≥ 0 is the contribution from opinions above truth andD− =
∑
i∈N− |xi−T | ≥ 0
is the contribution from opinions below truth. Using these notation, the average distance to truth is
1
n
∑n
i=1 |xi − T | = 1n (D+ + D−). As a consequence, the wisdom of the crowd described in equation 8
translates to ∣∣D+ −D−∣∣ << (D+ +D−). (9)
Two extreme cases are possible :
• Perfect wisdom of the crowd : opinions are homogeneously distributed around the true answer
and D+ = D− so that |x¯(1)− T | = 0.
• No wisdom of the crowd : opinions either totally overestimate or totally underestimate the correct
answer and either D− = 0 or D+ = 0, so that |x¯− T | = 1
n
n∑
i=1
|xi − T |.
We now turn to the empirical data. Only the first round is discussed here because, in the subsequent
rounds, the opinions are no longer independent, a criterion required for the wisdom of the crowd to occur. Fig.
S1 displays how opinions are distributed around the true value for the gauging game (A) and the counting
game (B). Both distributions fall between the two extreme cases with most opinions underestimating the
true value. However, the bias is more important in the counting game which explains that the wisdom of
the crowd is more prominent in the gauging game in the first round. This explains the differences between
mean opinion errors and individual errors observed in Fig. 5.
S3 Testing the linearity of the consensus model
The consensus model (1) assumes that the opinion change xi(t+ 1)− xi(t) grows linearly with the distance
between xi(t) and the mean opinion x¯(t). This assumption is tested against the alternative
xi(t+ 1)− xi(t) = β0 + α1(x¯(t)− xi(t))γ
with γ 6= 1. The numerical statistics values are reported for the opinion change between rounds 1 and 2 for
the gauging game. The same conclusions hold for the counting game and for the opinion change between
rounds 2 and 3. The linearity test provided in [66] applied to our data gives a statistics P = −1.4e7 with
empirical variance var(P ) = 4e14 so that we fail to reject the null hypothesis γ = 1 (p-val=0.5). Fig. S2
displays the evolution xi(t+ 1)− xi(t) against the distance to the mean x¯(t)− xi(t) along with the result of
the linear regression assuming γ = 1.
S4 Influenceability and personality
Is influenceability related to personality ? To answer this question, we required the participants to provide
information regarding their personality, gender, highest level of education, and whether they were native
(A) Gauging (B) Counting
−50 0 500 −50 0 500
Figure S1. Deviation of opinions to truth during the lone round 1. Red vertical lines split the
histogram into the opinions contributing negatively to the distance between mean opinion and truth
(left) and the opinions contributing positively to the distance between mean opinion and truth
(right). (A) gauging game; (B) counting game.
English speaker. The questionnaire regarding personality comes from a piece of work by Gosling and
Rentfrow [39] and was used to estimate the five general personality traits. The questionnaire page is reported
in supplementary Fig. S6. For each of the five traits, the participants rated how well they feel in adequacy
with a set of synonyms (rating s ∈ {1, . . . , 7}) and with a set of antonyms (rating a ∈ {1, . . . , 7}. This
redundancy allows for testing the consistency of the answer of each participants. The participants who had
a distance (8− a)− s too far away from 0 were discarded (threshold values were found using Iglewicz and
Hoaglin method based on median absolute deviation [47]). Partial Pearson’s linear correlations are first
reported between the individual traits measured by the questionnaire (see table S1). The correlation signs
are found to be consistent with the related literature on the topic [67]. This indicates that our measure
of the big five factors is trustworthy. Partial correlations are then provided to link the personal traits to
influenceability. As shown in Table S2, none of the measured personal traits is able to explain the variability
in the influenceability parameter. The only exceptions concern gender and being English native speaker,
with weak level of significance (p-val ∈ [0.01, 0.05]). However, these relations are consistent neither between
types of tasks nor over rounds, so that they cannot be trusted. We conclude that the big five personality
factors and the other measured individual traits are not relevant to explain the influenceability parameter.
Finding appropriate individual traits to explain the influenceability remains an open question.
(A) Participants from the counting game
C E A N Gen Eng Edu
O 0.45*** 0.38*** 0.31*** -0.35*** 0.03 -0.08 0.09
C 0.11 0.29*** -0.41*** -0.02 -0.06 0.29***
E 0.03 -0.15* 0.02 -0.05 0
A -0.48*** 0.11 -0.16* 0.15*
N 0.2** 0.08 -0.23***
Gen 0 0.01
Eng -0.12
(B) Participants from the gauging game
C E A N Gen Eng Edu
O 0.37*** 0.24*** 0.29*** -0.4*** 0.06 0.15* 0.16**
C 0.2*** 0.22*** -0.29*** 0.15** 0.12* 0.11
E -0.12* -0.12* 0.04 0.04 -0.03
A -0.34*** 0.01 -0.07 0.08
N 0.18** -0.02 -0.16**
Gen -0.03 0
Eng -0.02
Table S1. Partial Pearson’s linear correlations among the big five factors of personality (O:
openness, C : calmness, E : extroversion, A : agreeableness, N : neuroticism), gender (Gen),
native English speaker (Eng) and highest level of education (Edu). Significance : *p-val< 0.05,
**p-val< 0.01,***p-val< 0.001.
(A) Gauging (B) Counting
α(1) α(2)
O -0.1 -0.04
C 0.08 -0.06
E -0.1 0.02
A 0 -0.02
N -0.06 0.03
Gen -0.14* -0.05
Eng -0.09 0.02
Edu 0.05 -0.1
α(1) α(2)
0.07 -0.05
-0.05 -0.09
-0.01 -0.01
0.1 0.07
-0.1 0.01
0.03 0.12*
-0.03 -0.12*
-0.04 -0.1
Table S2. Partial Pearson’s linear correlations linking influenceability to the big five factors of
personality (O: openness, C : calmness, E : extroversion, A : agreableness, N : neuroticism), gendre
(Gen), native English speaker (Eng) and highest level of education (Edu). Significance : *p-val< 0.05,
**p-val< 0.01,***p-val< 0.001.
(A) Gauging (B) Counting
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Figure S2. Opinion change xi(t + 1) − xi(t) versus difference between mean and individual
opinion x¯(t) − xi(t). The color in each cell corresponds to the number of data points falling in
the cell. The color scale is logarithmic. The black strait line represents the linear regression
xi(t+ 1)−xi(t) = β0 +α(t)(x¯(t)−xi(t)). Top : opinion change from round 1 to 2 ; bottom : opinion
change from round 2 to 3. (A) gauging game; (B) counting game.
S5 Additional figures for prediction accuracy
S5.1 Confidence intervals for prediction errors
Fig. S3 displays error bars for 95% confidence interval of the RMSEs. This figure reveals that the two methods
depending on training set size do not perform significantly better than the consensus model with one couple of typical
influenceabilities, even for large training set sizes. This is an argument to favor the model in which the whole population
has a unique couple of influenceabilities (α(1), α(2)).
(A) Gauging - RMSE, detailed error bars
Individual past information
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(B) Counting - RMSE, detailed error bars
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9
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Figure S3. Root mean square error (RMSE) of the predictions with detailed error bars for the
final round.
S5.2 Prediction accuracy in terms of Mean Absolute Errors
Measuring prediction accuracy in terms of MAEs may appear more intuitive for comparing prediction methods. Fig. S4.
assesses the models using an absolute linear scale, where the errors are deliberately unscaled for the counting game. The
prediction methods rank equally when measured in terms of MAE or RMSE. Notice that, due to nonlinear relation
between RMSE and MAE, on this alternative scale, the consensus models errors are now closer from the null model than
from the unpredictability error. For comparison, recall that for the gauging game, the judgments range between 0 and
100 while they range between 0 and 500 for the counting game.
(C) Gauging - MAE
Individual past information
Null Cons Unp 1 5 10 15
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(D) Counting - MAE
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Figure S4. Mean absolute error (MAE) of the predictions (unscaled) for the final round.
Figure S5. Login page.
Figure S6. Questionnaire form.
Figure S7. Instruction page.
(A)
(B)
Figure S8. (A) Interface of the first round for the counting game, played alone. (B) Instances of pictures for
the gauging game.
Figure S9. Interface of the second and third rounds for the counting game, social rounds
Figure S10. Debrief page.
